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"Accountability mandates" -- the explicit linking of school funding, resources, and autonomy to student
performance on standardized exams -- have proliferated in the last 10 years. In this paper, we examine
California's accountability system, which for several years financially rewarded schools based on a
deterministic function of test scores. The sharp discontinuity in the assignment rule -- schools that
barely missed their target received no funding -- generates "as good as random" assignment of awards
for schools near their eligibility threshold and enables us to estimate the (local average) treatment effect
of California's financial award program.
This design allows us to explore an understudied aspect of accountability systems -- how schools use
their financial rewards. Our findings indicate that California's accountability system significantly increased
resources allocated to some schools. In the 2000 school year, the average value of the award was about
60 dollars per student and 50 dollars in 2001. Moreover, we find that the total resources flowing to
districts with schools that received awards increased more than dollar for dollar. This resource shift
was greatest for districts with schools that qualified for awards in the 2000 school year,the first year
of the program, increasing total per pupil revenues by roughly 5 percent.
Despite the increase in revenues, we find no evidence that these resources increased student achievement.
Schools that won awards did not purchase more instructional material, such as computers, which may
be inputs into achievement. Although the awards were likely paid out as teacher bonuses, we cannot
detect any effect of these bonuses on test scores or other measures of achievement. More worrisome,
we also find a practical effect of assigning the award based in part on the performance of "numerically
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\Accountability mandates" { the explicit linking of a public school's funding, resources, and auton-
omy to student performance on standardized tests { have proliferated in the last 10 years. A major
impetus to this proliferation was the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001, which requires
states test their students in reading and math annually from third to eighth grade. Accountability
mandates can be crudely divided into those that rely primarily on \carrots" { money and recog-
nition awarded to schools, its teachers, sta, and/or students for performing well on these tests {
and those that rely on \sticks" { withholding of funds, intervention, or outright takeover for low
performing schools.1
The accountability reforms in the California Public School system that we study are an example
of the rst type: schools and teachers within those schools that made adequate progress or attained
a \passing grade" were rewarded with cash bonuses. Three programs provided mechanisms for re-
warding schools and teachers in high performing California schools: the Governors Performance
Award Program (GPAP), the Certicated Sta Performance Incentive Award (CSPIA), and the
Schoolsite Employee Performance Bonus (SEPB). While one of these programs (GPAP) \was en-
visioned as money to be used for school site purposes [e.g., purchasing computers]," the California
Department of Education found it was in many cases \awarded to certicated sta [i.e., teach-
ers] in the way of bonuses or stipends..."2 In eect, the three programs combined to substantial
teacher bonuses. GPAP was funded for up to $150 per pupil at winning schools. Assuming, as the
California Department of Education suggests, that these funds were paid out as teacher bonuses,
1While deferrals and withholding of funds is stipulated as a possible intervention in NCLB, to our knowledge it
has not been practiced in any state. Most systems that rely on \sticks" threaten state takeover and/or outright
closure of a school.
2See page 4 of the document by Patrick J. Chladek, http://www.wcer.wisc.edu/CPRE/conference/nov02/chladek.pdfAs
we explain further below, schools had discretion on how to spend these awards.
2distributed funds amounted to an additional $1300 per teacher. Explicit bonuses paid out under
the CSPIA ranged from $5,000 to $25,000 per teacher and the SEPB paid on average $591 per
full-time equivalent (FTE). Thus, teachers at winning schools could have earned up to $27,000,
although $2,000 was probably more typical.
In this paper, we evaluate the eect of these three programs with particular focus on the
questions of immediate policy relevance: what happens when (through an accountability system)
we increase a school's resources? How does the school spend these additional resources? Given
that the awards ended up mainly as teacher bonuses, did the awards and teacher bonuses increase
student achievement?
An important challenge to evaluations of interventions based on student performance on stan-
dardized tests is that these tests are necessarily imperfect. As Kane and Staiger (2002) note,
since exam scores contain both \noise" and \signal," measures of aggregate student performance
at smaller schools will be noisier than those at large schools with similar students. The presence
of noise can have important consequences for naive before and after comparisons of schools facing
accountability mandates. Chay, McEwan, and Urquiola (2005), for example, document that ac-
counting for mean reversion in exam performance substantially reduces the estimated impact of a
Chilean accountability-like program on test score gains. A related challenge is that since student
bodies change, assessing which changes in exam performance are merely the \spurious" consequence
of changing student characteristics rather than changes in school practices per se can be dicult.3
The deterministic nature of California's awards program allows us to circumvent many of the
dicult issues involved in evaluating the use of these resources and their impacts on student achieve-
3Figlio and Rouse (2006), for example, nd that much of the estimated test score gains associated with Florida's
school accountability system can be accounted for by changes in the characteristics of students in the state rather
than noise.
3ment. Schools and teachers within those schools that met a pre-determined threshold for improve-
ment in exam performance were rewarded with a signicant bonus. The sharp discontinuity in the
assignment rule - schools that barely missed the performance target received no bonuses - generates
quasi-random assignment in awards recipiency for schools that are close to their eligibility thresh-
old. This quasi-random assignment allows us to generate credible estimates of the impact of the
cash bonuses associated with this school-based incentive program on both test scores and a host of
other outcomes. Most important for our purposes is the question of how these additional resources
were used. Our approach also provides a large battery of over-identication tests, which allow us
to evaluate the validity of the design.
While this research design has many advantages, it falls short of being a complete assessment
of the program's eect on the level and distribution of measured achievement in California. Specif-
ically, it cannot capture any eects of the program that occur uniformly to schools that received
the awards (\treatment" schools) and schools that did not (\control" schools). For instance, if the
mere presence of the awards program causes all schools to sabotage more important goals in favor
of more narrowly tailoring curriculum to maximize test scores, our design will not capture such
eects. Moreover, for a school that receives funds from the program, the counterfactual to which
it is compared is an otherwise similar school within California that did not receive the funds. Also
of interest, but outside the scope of the current paper, is the counterfactual school that was not
subject to any accountability scheme.
Although such counterfactuals are of clear interest, our setting is not well suited for a direct
evaluation of the incentive eects of California's accountability system. There are two reasons we
believe the California rewards program oered only very weak incentives: rewards were allocated
based on group performance (i.e., to all teachers and sta in a winning school) and the resulting
4nancial reward was only a one-time bonus. Individual level performance pay based on a clear
measure of output is usually thought to provide the strongest incentives to workers. The group
nature of the awards thus faces the free-rider problem, and this should mute the impact and
incentive eect of the program for any individual teacher, for example. Moreover, CSPIA and
SEPB were only funded for one year and GPAP for only two years.4 Thus, schools and teachers
did not have much opportunity to learn how to cost-eectively increase their odds of winning the
rewards. In addition, the instability of the funding of the program both weakens their incentives
and possibly sends a signal that they are not core elements of the California accountability scheme.
As a result our paper focuses not on the direct incentive eects of the program but on those
of immediate policy relevance: how do schools spend additional resources from an accountability
scheme? And does the schools' use of these resources increase student achievement?
We nd that California's program had a signicant impact on the nancial resources allocated to
some schools. The average value of the 2000 school year (SY) GPAP award was roughly $1400 per
teacher and $1200 per teacher for the 2001 SY award.5 At its peak, the nancial resources owing
to districts with schools that qualied for awards was about 5 percent of per pupil and 6 percent
of per teacher resources. We nd no evidence, based on either nancial or school census data, that
these resources were used for instructional purposes. Thus, despite the increase in resources, we
nd little measurable improvement in standard metrics of achievement, such as exam performance,
for those schools that received the award compared to those schools that did not.6
4California budget shortfalls led to the program cuts. The most sizable teacher bonuses of $5,000-$25,000 under
the CSPIA was suspended after lawsuits were led. Errors by Harcourt Educational Measurement led to scoring
inations and errors. Teachers and schools led suit saying they were unfairly excluded from the awards program.
(Modesto Bee, October 2001)
5When discussing school years, we adopt the convention in the literature of calling Fall YY01 to Spring YY02 the
YY02 school year.
6One argument for accountability programs is its low cost relative to other types of education reforms such as
class-size reduction. For instance, see Hoxby (2002).
5Our ndings suggest that untargeted awards and indiscriminate merit pay to teachers and sta
do not guarantee future improvements in academic achievement. This is consistent with the mixed
evidence from other studies of school-based teacher incentive pay. For example, while Clotfelter
and Ladd (1996) and Ladd (1999) nd Dallas' school-based program was associated with signicant
gains in student achievement, the positive eects found a year before the actual program was in eect
suggest this was part of a pre-existing trend. Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2003) nd short-term but
no long-term gains in achievement in a teacher incentive pay experiment in Kenya, where similar
to California school teachers, all teachers in the winning school got the same reward. Evidence
on the impact of individual teacher performance incentives is also mixed. While Lavy (2003) and
Figlio and Kenny (2007) nd individual teacher incentive pay is associated with gains in student
achievement, Eberts, Hollenbeck and Stone (2002) nd it is unrelated to student achievement.7
In what follows, we rst discuss California's accountability system and the various awards pro-
grams, with particular focus on the determinants of awards eligibility. Along with the institutional
background, we present a statistical portrayal of California schools by award receipt. We pro-
ceed in Section 3 with a discussion of our econometric framework for estimating the eect of the
awards. Our ndings are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 oers a summary and concluding
observations.
2 Background: California's Academic Performance Index and Gov-
ernor's Performance Award Program
California's accountability system, which predates NCLB, was established by the Public Schools
Accountability Act (PSAA) of 1999. The PSAA was motivated by assessments indicating that
7As Figlio and Kenney (2007) acknowledge, however, they cannot rule out pure selection eects using their cross-
sectional design.
6California students were not progressing at the rate necessary \to achieve a high quality education."
Its goal is \to hold each of the state's public schools accountable for the academic progress and
achievement of its pupils within the resources available to schools."8
To measure progress and rank public schools within the state, the PSAA created the \Academic
Performance Index" (API). The API is intended to be a summary measure of school-wide perfor-
mance on various standardized tests. The index ranges from 200 to 1000 and combines test scores
from students in grades 2 to 11. The tests (or other indicators) used and weights accorded to each
API component vary from year to year. For the rst two years of the program { the only years that
the budget allocated funds for performance awards { the API was based solely on the nationally
norm-referenced Stanford 9 exam. In broad outline, the API is a (noisy) weighted average of several
dierent exams measured in terms of national percentile ranks, although its precise calculation is
somewhat unclear.9 For middle and elementary schools, the API incorporated scores on reading,
language arts, spelling, and math exams. For high schools, the API was based on reading, language
arts, math, science and social studies exams.10
In the 2000 SY, two other awards programs were funded by the State { the Certicated Sta
Performance Incentive Award (CSPIA) and the Schoolsite Employee Performance Bonus (SEPB).
8See California Education Code 52050-52050.5 for a statement of Legislative Intent.
9It is impossible to do justice to how the API is calculated but the following very abbreviated summary in Rogosa
(2003) may be useful: \For completeness, here's a quick reminder of the calculations for the API metric. For a
Stanford 9 test, transform the national percentile rank into quintiles: 1-19, 20-39, 40-59, 60-79, 80-99. The quintiles
are assigned values 200, 500, 700, 875, 1000; an individual's API score on a single test is the value for the attained
quintile. For any collection of students, the API component score for a single test (e.g. Reading) is the average, over
the individuals, of these values (any missing test scores are imputed by the mean of the group). For the battery of
tests, API scores in grades 2-8 are a combination of Math (.4), Reading (.3), Language (.15), and Spelling (.15). API
scores in grades 9-11 are a combination of Math (.2), Reading (.2), Language (.2), Science (.2) and Social Science
(.2)."
10In 2001, the API was based on both the Stanford 9 and the California Standards Test in English-Language Arts
(CST ELA). Additional test components have been added since then. Documentation suggests that other performance
indicators such as graduation and attendance rates have also been incorporated into the API calculation but it is
unclear how this is done. By law, however, test results must constitute at least 60 percent of the API. For additional
details, see API information guides for each year.
7In contrast to the GPAP, which were awarded directly to schools, these awards targeted employees
{ certicated sta, i.e. teachers, in the rst instance and both certicated and classied (i.e.
paraprofessional, administrative and clerical) sta in the second. The SEPB did, however, grant
half of its $350 million award to the schools for unrestricted uses.11
Like the GPAP, both awards were paid out based on API growth, although the $100 million
CSPIA was allocated only to sta at schools that demonstrated the greatest growth over twice their
GPAP target and had shown growth in the 2000 SY. The SEPB was paid to all schools (and sta
in schools) that received the GPAP. Because only schools or the employees of schools that received
the GPAP could have received these other two awards, our GPAP analysis below is sucient to
capture the combined eect of these award programs on achievement. We discuss the implications
of these additional award programs for our analysis of resources in section 4.3.12
2.1 Award Eligibility { The Simple Case
One bit of complexity in California's accountability system is that performance awards are based on
API \growth" scores { the year to year change in API { for a school as well as for each \numerically
signicant subgroup." Before describing what numerically signicant subgroups are and how they
aect eligibility, we rst explain the award determination for a school without subgroups.
Award eligibility is based on a comparison of a school's growth score with its \target." In the
simplest case, for schools without subgroups, the \API growth target" in a given year is ve percent
of the distance from the previous year's API to the statewide target of 800 or a specied minimum.
In the 2000 SY, the minimum gain was set to one point; in the 2001 SY, it was raised to ve points.
11The CDE provides very little information about the SEPB. Discussion of the sharing rules were found only in
news reports, such as the one available here: http://www.svcn.com/archives/lgwt/04.04.01/education-0114.html
12Note, however, that because these programs were eectively suspended after the 2000 SY, our analysis of the
2001 SY, the second year of the awards program captures the eect of the GPAP alone. Results for the 2001 SY,
which are available upon request are quite similar to those for the 2000 SY.
8In other words, to receive an award based on 2001 SY performance, schools had to achieve the
maximum of ve percent of the distance to the statewide target of 800 or ve points.
The 2000 and 2001 SY award decision rules can be expressed simply as
Target2000SY = max(40   :05  baseAPI99;1) (1)
Target2001SY = max(40   :05  baseAPI00;5) (2)
where Targett is the minimum gain score (or one year change in API) needed to qualify for an
award in year t and baseAPIt is just the (adjusted) API from t   1.13
Figure 1 plots the 2000 and 2001 SY award targets and demonstrates several noteworthy features
of California's awards program. First, although not made explicit in the ocial rules, gain scores
are always rounded to the nearest integer and thus the awards eligibility thresholds are represented
as a step function. Second, and perhaps most importantly, poor performing schools (i.e. schools
with lower initial API scores) have to achieve larger test score gains to receive an award than do
high achieving schools. Finally, the gure claries the eects of the minimum targets set in each
year. In the 2000 SY, schools with base scores at or above 780 needed to gain only one point over
their initial year score to qualify for an award. In the 2001 SY, award eligibility was contingent
on a minimum gain score of 5 points. This change had the eect of uniformly raising the award
threshold by 5 points for those at or above an API of 780 while increasing the target by the nearest
integer value of 0:05  baseAPI   35 for those with an API of 700 to 780.
13The California Department of Education adjusts base scores to make them \psychometrically" equivalent to the
growth scores in the following year. In other words, in principle the base score in a given year, baseAPIt, can dier
from the growth score in the previous year, APIt-1.
92.2 Award Eligibility with Numerically Signicant Subgroups
The PSAA also mandates that \numerically signicant" subgroups make \comparable achieve-
ment," dened as 80 percent of the school-wide growth target. Subgroups are dened by racial/ethnic
categories (African American, American Indian, Asian, Filipino, Hispanic, Pacic Islander and Cau-
casian) and socioeconomic disadvantage.14 A disadvantaged student must either qualify for free
or reduced-priced meals or come from a family where the highest level of education is below high
school completion. Subgroups with fewer than 30 tested students are not numerically signicant.
To achieve \numerical signicance" a subgroup must have between 30 and 99 tested students and
constitute at least 15 percent of total enrollment or have 100 or more tested students.
Table I documents the award eligibility calculation for two elementary schools with multiple
subgroups in the 2001 SY). 15 The rst column of Table I indicates the overall size of the school and
the number of students tested in each subgroup.16 Both schools have over 800 students enrolled,
putting them above the 75th percentile of elementary school enrollments in the state. Both schools
also have tested students in each of the state-dened subgroup categories but they dier in terms
of which groups are sizable enough to be subject to performance targets. Neither school has tested
numbers of American Indians, Filipinos, Asians, or Pacic Islanders above 30, exempting them
from subgroup performance targets. African American students in Salida Union are also exempt
since they number only 16. In contrast, since the tested numbers of Hispanics, whites, and socially
14While racial/ethnic subgroups are mutually exclusive, the socially disadvantaged category may contain students
from the racial/ethnic subgroups.
15Data on academic performance for the 2000 - 2004 SYs as well as the monetary awards apportioned to schools
under the GPAP for performance in the 2000 and 2001 SYs come directly from the California Department of Education
(CDE). School characteristics come from the CDE's California Basic Educational Data System (CBEDS), an annual
school-based census. From CBEDS, we collect data on student enrollment, the allocation of teachers across subjects,
in addition to other demographic characteristics such as racial breakdown, parental education, and percent of students
receiving free lunch. All of our data sources are described in more detail in the Data Appendix.
16Small schools, dened as having between 11 and 99 valid Stanford 9 test scores, as well as \very small schools"
(fewer than 11 valid scores) were evaluated under a separate, \Alternative Accountability System".
10disadvantaged students are greater than 100 in both schools, these groups must meet the subgroup
performance targets. Tested African American students in Mission Elementary are also subject to
subgroup rules as they number well over 30 and represent over 15 percent of tested students.
To gauge award eligibility, columns (2) and (3) show growth and base year API scores, respec-
tively. Column (4) takes the dierence between the two and column (5) calculates the score needed
to qualify for an award. A school is award eligible if the gain score (column 4) equals or exceeds
the target (column 5) for the school as a whole and for each numerically signicant subgroup.
Based on school performance alone, both schools would have qualied for an award. This can
be seen in the rst row (labeled \Overall") in each panel. Specically, Mission Elementary had a
growth year score of 692 and a base year score of 682. Thus, it achieved growth of 10 API points, 4
points above the school-wide target of 6. Salida Union Elementary had a growth year score of 696,
gaining 32 points on its base year score of 664 and 25 points on its target of 7. However, only Salida
Union met both the school target and all of its subgroup performance requirements. Two (out of
four) of Mission Elementary's numerically signicant subgroups failed to meet their performance
target of 5 API points (80 percent of the school target). The API for Hispanic students actually
fell nine points and that for socially disadvantaged students (a category that may contain students
from the racial/ethnic subgroups) stayed the same.
Since a school cannot qualify for an award unless all performance targets are met, for the
purposes of the regression discontinuity design employed subsequently, we characterize each school
by the minimum of the dierence between the gain scores and targets for the school overall and each
of its numerically signicant subgroups. Thus, Mission Elementary, despite a passing performance
overall, is assigned the Hispanic award gap of -14 points, its highest barrier to award eligibility. In
contrast, all subgroups at Salida Union Elementary had gain scores that exceed their performance
11targets. Socially disadvantaged students had the smallest \improvement" in scores, 18 points, and
the minimum dierence in gain score and performance target. Thus, we characterize Salida Union
Elementary by an \award gap" of 12 API points, which qualied the school for an award.
2.3 GPAP Award Allocations
Table II describes GPAP allocations and performance overall and by award receipt status. The
overall means, in the rst column of the table, are based on all elementary, middle and high schools
that met the testing participation requirements for the program (95 percent in elementary and
middle schools and 90 percent in high schools) and had valid API scores for both base and growth
years in the 2000, 2001 or both school years. The rst column gives the overall means. The next
four columns separate the data into schools that never won an award over the sample period, schools
that won an award only for the 2000 SY, schools that won an award only for the 2001 SY, and
schools that won an award for both school years.
As shown in the rst row, about 23 percent of the sample is composed of schools that never won
an award. About 31 percent of schools won awards for the 2000 SY alone. Due at least in part to the
state's raising the award eligibility threshold, the share winning awards for 2001 SY performance
alone is only 14.7 percent or about half of the corresponding 2000 SY gure. In contrast, almost
32 percent of schools won awards in both the 2000 and 2001 school years.17 The average per pupil
payment was about $63 across both years, a few dollars less than the average $69 per pupil payment
indicated by the state.18 To put this in perspective, K-12 public school expenditures in California
in the 2000 SY year were roughly $6000 per student (Carroll et al. 2005). Thus, in principle, these
17Note that these gures are not strictly correct since the observations in the table are at the school-year not the
school level. But, since there are roughly the same number of schools with valid testing data in both years, this is a
good approximation. Expressed by school, 19.2 percent never won an award, 34.4 percent won for the 2000 SY alone,
14.5 percent won for the 2001 SY alone, and 31.9 percent won for both years.
18This small discrepancy between our and the ocial gures, however, is likely due to dierences in the quality of
enrollment data.
12awards raised per pupil spending by just over 1 percent. More importantly, perhaps, awardees have
considerable discretion (requiring only local school board approval) in how they use these funds. To
the extent that these resources were paid to teachers, as the CDE has suggested, they amount to
bonuses of almost $1400 per teacher. Moreover, as we will show in section 4.3, additional resources
owed to districts and thus presumably schools that qualied for awards. Thus, the ocial gures
likely understate the true awards that winning schools received.
The fourth row of Table II shows school enrollments. The enrollment gures speak to a funda-
mental problem with relying on mean test scores to measure school performance (Kane and Staiger
2001; Chay et al. 2005). Specically, due to large error variances, test scores from any given year
provide a poor measure of school rankings. This problem is particularly acute for small schools,
since, all else equal, their mean score will have higher sampling variation. The implication of this
higher sampling variation is that small schools are more likely to have a particularly lucky year
and win a performance award. Consistent with this, Table II shows that schools that won awards
in both years are smaller (p < 0:001) and schools that never won an award larger (p < 0:001) than
the average school. Furthermore elementary schools, which are the smallest type of school in our
sample, with an average enrollment of 636 pupils, are underrepresented in the category of schools
that never won awards and overrepresented among those winning awards in both years. While
they make up 70 percent of schools in our sample, elementary schools represent only 49 percent
of schools that never won an award and about 85 percent of those winning in both years. At the
other extreme, high schools, which are by far the largest type of school in our sample, represent
about 13 percent of the sample but almost 30 percent of schools that never won an award and only
3 percent of schools that won awards in both years.
The eighth and ninth rows of Table II explore the implications of the state's subgroup rules.
13The typical school has only one subgroup; 15 percent of schools have no subgroups. The most
common subgroups are socially disadvantaged, followed by Hispanic and white. Not surprisingly,
since schools with subgroups face additional eligibility criteria, schools that never won an award
have more subgroups and those that won awards in both years have fewer subgroups than the
average school. The next row shows the share of schools in each category that lost an award due to
subgroup rules. Put dierently, this row shows the share of schools that would have won an award
absent the subgroup rules. Overall, about 18 percent of schools would have won an award based
on school performance alone but were ineligible because of subgroup rules. About 45 percent of
schools that never won an award would have won without the subgroup rules. This average over
the two award years masks dierences across the two years attributable to the evolving awards
eligibility criteria. Whereas 53 percent of schools in the never group would have won awards based
on the school criteria alone for the 2000 SY, only about 38 percent would have won for 2001 SY
performance were it not for the subgroup rules. In other words, raising the standards for schools
had the eect of minimizing the bite of the subgroup rules.19.
The next set of nine rows in Table II show the average API score across award years overall
and separately for all numerically signicant subgroups. The mean API score in the sample is
652. White, Asian and Filipino subgroups perform well above average. Socially disadvantaged
subgroups, which are numerically signicant in 9082 of our 10720 school-year observations, have an
API of 581, almost two thirds of a standard deviation below the overall average. Hispanics are the
next most common subgroup. They are numerically signicant in 8462 school-years and have an
API of 574, also well below the overall mean. Not surprisingly, since those with lower API scores
19This eect can also be seen by comparing the share of 2000 SY awards winners that lost awards in the 2001 SY
with the share of 2001 SY awards winners that lost awards in the 2000 SY due to subgroup rules. While 20 percent
of 2001 SY awards winner would have won awards in 2000 based on the school performance alone, only about 15
percent of 2000 SY winners would have done so in 2001
14need to make larger gains in order to qualify for an award, mean API scores overall and within
each subgroup are lowest for the set of schools that never won awards. Below the API scores are
nine rows showing the average gain scores, the basis for award eligibility, across years for schools
overall as well as for each subgroup. The average gain score is about 26 points but is less than 10
for schools that never won an award and just over 40 for schools that won in both years.
These summary statistics illustrate the dierences in characteristics of schools who won awards
versus those that did not, and highlight the need for a valid empirical design in evaluating the
impact of award receipt on school behavior, ceteris paribus. Consequently, in the work that follows
we will rst demonstrate that there was in fact a treatment generated by the award program. We
then try to determine whether award receipt had any eect on either the level of API scores (overall
and for each numerically signicant subgroup) or on school resources.
3 Econometric Framework
To identify the causal impact of California's awards program on outcomes such as API scores
or resource allocations, we employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design where we essentially
compare the behavior of schools that just barely won an award to those that just barely missed
winning an award.20 Our design is similar to the original RD approach used by Thistlewaite
and Campbell (1960) to estimate the impact of a test-based scholarship award program on future
academic outcomes except our unit of analysis is the school. Although individual student data
would be appealing, particularly for estimating the impact of the awards program on achievement,
these data are dicult, if not impossible, to obtain. Moreover, since the PSAA is ultimately based
on average school performance, school-level data is sucient for characterizing the program.
20More precisely, as shown in Lee (2005), we will estimate a weighted average of the population treatment eects,
where the weights are positively related to each observation's distance to their awards target. Thus, schools closest to
their awards threshold will contribute the most and those farthest away the least to the estimated treatment eect.
15Suppose that the relationship between schools' average performance and resources and their
receipt of an award is given by the constant treatment eects model:
Yi =  + Ti + Xi + i (3)
Ti = 1(Di  0) (4)
where Yi is school i's achievement score or measure of resources;  is a constant; and Ti is an
indicator equal to 1 if school i received an award. In addition, let Di equal the school's distance to
its award eligibility target ((APIit   APIit 1)   Targeti), so that zero corresponds to having just
met the target.
The primary challenge to estimating the eect of the award program  is that awards are not
randomly allocated across schools. A simple comparison of schools that receive the treatment to
those that do not will be biased because treated schools dier greatly from untreated schools for
reasons other than the treatment. As our discussion above and Table II show, for example, schools
with more minorities or subgroups are signicantly less likely to receive an award.
To overcome this problem, we exploit the rules assigning treatment. Schools for whom Di  0
win the award; schools for whom Di < 0 do not. The sharp discontinuity in the rules that translate
test scores into award eligibility generates quasi-random assignment of award receipt near the
eligibility threshold. To see how this works, consider the average outcome for treated schools with
a specic value for their score (Di =  > 0):
E[YijT = 1;Di = ] =  +  + E[XjD = ] + E[jDi = ]:
Likewise consider a school that does not receive the treatment Di =   < 0 whose score is 
below the threshold:
16E[YijT = 0;Di =  ] =  + E[XjD =  ] + E[jDi =  ]:
A naive comparison { the average outcome for treated schools above the threshold by an amount
 to those untreated schools who are below the threshold by an amount  to the average outcome
for the untreated is merely:
E[YijT = 1;Di = ]   E[YijT = 0;Di =  ] =  +  E[XjD = ]   E[XjD =  ]
| {z }
Dierence in Observables
+E[jDi = ]   E[jDi =  ]
| {z }
Dierence in Unobservables
Now consider choosing  to be small so that we are comparing schools just above the threshold
to those just below. In the limit, as   ! 0 the above expression reduces to:
lim
 !0
E[YijT = 1;Di = ]   E[YijT = 0;Di =  ] =  + E[XjD = 0]   E[XjD =  0]
+E[jDi = 0]   E[jDi =  0]
= 
That is, as we approach the threshold from the left and the right, both the unobservable and
observable dierences of treated schools become smaller and smaller. This research design provides a
large number of testable restrictions, which are similar to those available in a randomized controlled
trial (RCT), and add to the credibility of the design. In particular, in an RCT a basic specication
test is to compare the average baseline characteristics of treated group to the control group. In a
proper RCT these will be the same on average. Likewise, in this research design, schools just to
the left and just to the right of the threshold should look similar.
As a practical matter, it is not necessary to limit the comparison to just the few schools to
17the left and the right of the threshold. One can recast the problem as estimation of the following
relationship:
Yi =  + Ti + g(Di) + i
where g() is a unknown continuous function. Although unknown it can be approximated suciently
well by polynomials in D and its full interactions with the awards indicator T. In practice below,
we determined that the fth-order polynomial was the most parsimonious specication implied by
the underlying data.21
A minor issue is the fact that we have only considered the causal impact of the binary treatment.
In fact, there are dierent levels of the award, or varying treatment intensities. This can be
accommodated easily by recasting the problem as a simple instrumental variables estimator for the
following equation system:
Yi = 0 + Ai + g0(Di) + 0
i
Ai =  +  Ti + h(Di) + i
Yi =  + Ti + g(Di) + i
=  +  Ti + g(Di) + i
In this set up, Ai is the endogenous regressor, the second equation is the \rst stage" equation,
and the third equation is the \reduced form" equation for the outcome. Our estimate of  is merely
the indirect least squares estimate
b 
b   { the ratio of the discontinuity in the outcome equation to
21To illustrate this, our graphs below superimpose the predicted values from the polynomial on top of the means
for each discrete point of support. We explain these graphs and other specication tests below.
18the ratio of the discontinuity in the award equation. If we wish to consider the case where the
treatment eect is random, then provided that monotonicity holds (the eect of higher growth
scores is uniformly to increase the probability of receiving treatment) then this parameter identies
the local average treatment eect or the eect of the program on those schools induced to win
the award by their score (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klauuw 2001). Finally, just as in an RCT,
provided that the X's are balanced (a restriction we test), we can also include exogenous covariates
X for variance reduction purposes, although they are not required for consistent estimation of the
parameter of interest.
3.1 Estimation Issues
In order to implement the RD, we need to rst verify that the Governor's Performance Award
Program rewarded API growth in both according to the established rules. To cut down on the
number of gures, we only show results for the 2000 SY. Results for the 2001 SY are similar and
are available upon request.
Figure 2 shows the share of schools receiving an award payment for their 2000 SY Performance
at each distance from the eligibility threshold. Average award payments expressed per pupil and
per teacher for schools at each distance from the eligibility threshold are shown in Figures 3a and
3b, respectively. Across gures, the solid lines represent a parametric estimate of the conditional
probability of an awards payment (Fig. 2) or of the per pupil (Fig. 3a) or per teacher (Fig.
3b) payment amount to schools at each distance, D; from the eligibility threshold. Each school's
distance to its eligibility threshold is just ((APIt APIt 1) Targett) or the dierence between its
gain score and growth target as dened above. Consistent estimation of the treatment eect requires
that our polynomial be suciently exible to capture the true underlying continuous function.
19Operationally, our parametric estimates are just the least squares tted values from the following
equation:
A = T + P00 + TP01 + X0 + " (5)
where A is either the probability of awards recipiency or the per pupil award payment, T  1(D  0)
is an indicator for whether a school crossed the eligibility threshold, P0 = (D;D2;D3;D4;D5) is a
fth order polynomial of the distance, D, to the awards threshold and TP0 is the interaction of our
eligibility indicator with this fth order polynomial. We include the interactions so as to allow the
polynomial t to dier on either side of the eligibility threshold.22
One potential problem, more apparent than real, is that our polynomial provides an inadequate
parameterization of the true underlying continuous function. While in principle we could use
nonparametric local linear regression or other techniques, as Lee and Card (2008) observe, such
techniques confront the diculty that the underlying data (changes in test scores) are not actually
continuous but rather discrete. In this case, the \true" nonparametric estimator is just the set of
mass points in the running variable.
Consequently, as we explain in more detail below, we assess the adequacy of our parametric rep-
resentation by comparing our model to the fully saturated model that includes a separate indicator
for every specic value of the running variable:
A = d
X
Zdd + X0 +  (6)
22For variance reduction purposes, we also include X, a set of control variables that include: a school's total enroll-
ment, the number of numerically signicant subgroups in the school, the percent of tested students by race/ethnicity
(white, black, Hispanic, Filipino, Asian, Pacic Islander, or American Indian), the share of students qualifying for
free or reduced price meals, and dummies for whether the school is an elementary or high school (with middle school
the omitted category). All covariates correspond to the academic year of the growth year score, i.e. t not (t   1).
Standard errors are adjusted to allow for an arbitrary correlation in errors at the level of D, the distance to the
awards threshold, as suggested by Card and Lee (2006) to account for potential misspecication.
20where Zd is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the school's distance is equal to d, and 0 otherwise,
d are xed eects for each distance to (and including) the awards eligibility threshold, and X is
the set of covariates dened above. The coecients d, which are just regression adjusted average
award payment probabilities or per pupil award payments, are represented as open circles in our
gures below. Plotting these coecients along with our parametric t allows for a simple \eyeball"
test of the extent to which our estimates are a spurious consequence of \noise" in the data. Below,
we also describe and present the results of more formal tests.
Figure 2 shows that, as per the award rules, there is a marked discontinuity in the probability
of receiving an award at the eligibility threshold. Schools that failed to meet their target, and
thus are to the left of the eligibility threshold, are not observed receiving an award payment.23
At the threshold, where a school's API equals its target, the probability of receiving an award
jumps to almost one. The estimated discontinuity is 0.93 with a t-stat of almost 80. Both the
regression adjusted averages and the polynomial t past zero are also strictly below one because
a small fraction of schools, about 8 percent in the 2000 SY, made their API target but did not
receive an awards payment. According to the California Department of Education these schools
may have been disqualied because of \data irregularities," too high a share (over 15 percent) of
parents obtaining exam waivers for their children, or student population changes that invalidated
the school's API.
Figures 3a and 3b are analogous to Figure 2 except that the dependent variable is the per
pupil and per teacher award payments rather than a simple dichotomous measure of recipiency.
We show the payments in per teacher terms in light of evidence suggesting that the awards were
23In actuality, in the 2000 SY, 5 schools or 0.3 percent of schools that according to our data failed to meet their
target received awards payment from the State averaging $60.5 per pupil. In 2001, none of the \failing" schools
received GPAP payments.
21paid out as cash bonuses to teachers. As expected, schools to the left of the eligibility threshold
did not receive award apportionments and thus have per pupil award payments of $0. At the
discontinuity the per pupil award payments jump sharply. The estimated discontinuity based on
2000 SY performance is about $62 per pupil with a t-stat of 80. Expressed as a per teacher award,
the estimated discontinuity is about $1300 with a t-stat of over 70.
A visual comparison of the estimates from our parametric models and the regression adjusted
averages of award recipiency suggests that the fth-order polynomial ts are reasonable. We con-
rm this using a more formal test. Following Lee and Card (2008), we calculate a goodness of
t statistic, G 
(RSSr RSSur)=(J K)
RSSur=(N J) , where RSSr is the residual sum of squares from the re-
stricted (polynomial-tted) model, RSSur is the residual sum of squares from the fully exible
or unrestricted model, J is the number of parameters in the unrestricted model, K the number
of parameters in the restricted model and N the number of observations. Under normality G is
distributed F(J   K;N   K). With this F-statistic we can test the null hypothesis that the t
of the polynomial model is as good or has as much explanatory power as the fully exible model.
Across all our awards recipiency models (any award, award per pupil and award per teacher), G is
less than one (0.773, 0.764, and 0.790, respectively). In all cases, the F-statistics indicate that we
cannot reject the null that the restricted and unrestricted models have similar goodness of ts.
The framework used above to establish the discontinuity in the GPAP, is the same estimating
equation we employ to determine the causal impact of the program. More specically, we will use
(4) to estimate the treatment eect on Y (instead of A), and we will use (5) to test the sensitivity
of this estimate to our functional form assumptions. The ratio of the RD estimate of our outcome
of interest, say math teachers or spending per pupil in year t + 1, to the RD estimate of award
recipiency or per pupil award apportionments in t, will form our causal estimate of the treatment
22on the treated.
One concern in interpreting this ratio as a causal estimate, however, is that other predetermined
school characteristics may be changing at the same time. As discussed above, identication of 
requires that X is continuous at d = 0: For example, if schools near the discontinuity encourage
certain types of students to transfer to other schools, we may see changes in the share of students
by race or socioeconomic status. Since these factors independently aect outcomes, they will, at
least in principle, confound our estimates of the treatment eect of the awards program.
The fact that the state uses API changes, which should be considerably noisier and more dicult
to manipulate than levels, to allocate awards should lend considerable credibility to our research
design. But, while we cannot prove that all other predetermined characteristics are balanced, we
can check to see whether observable characteristics are smooth through the discontinuity. To do
this, we have plotted regression adjusted averages of and estimated polynomial ts to the 2000 SY
values of all covariates described above as well as some other available characteristics, against the
distance to the threshold for schools.
Appendix Table I reports the estimated discontinuities at the 2000 SY awards threshold for each
of these predetermined characteristics. In 12 out of 14 cases, the estimated discontinuity is not
statistically distinguishable from zero at even the 10 percent level. Thus, by in large, the estimated
discontinuities reported in Appendix Table I provide support for the idea that schools close to the
eligibility threshold are similar on predetermined characteristics.
Two cases merit some additional discussion. We estimate a small discontinuity in the percent
of students qualifying for free or reduced price meals and the percent of tested students that are
Asian American. Neither are signicantly dierent from zero at conventional levels (i.e. 5 percent),
but the p-values for each are only about 0.07. For free or reduced price meals, the point estimate
23implies a 4.7 percentage point or roughly 10 percent drop in the share of students qualifying in
schools that just received awards relative to those schools that just missed receiving an awards.
For the share of test-takers that are Asian American, the implied eect is a 1.8 percentage point
or an almost 23 percent increase. Importantly, we nd no evidence of a discontinuity in the share
of students eligible for free or reduced price meals or in the share of test takers that are Asian
American in the 2001 SY (available upon request). The fact that those characteristics for which we
cannot strictly rule out a discontinuity dier across the two award years, gives us some hope that
they are generated by random variation. As is well understood, with a large number of comparisons
a small fraction of these are expected to be \signicant" by sheer random variation.
To the extent that these discontinuities are real, however, they suggest that our estimates may
be slightly biased towards nding an impact of the awards program on academic achievement. For
example, students qualifying for the school meals program, who are automatically characterized
as socially disadvantaged, are more likely to perform poorly (see the API scores for socially dis-
advantaged subgroups in Table II). Similarly, African American students perform below average
as a subgroup. Asian Americans, by contrast, perform well above the state average. Thus, at the
discontinuity, a drop in the share of students qualifying for free or reduced price meals and a bump
up in the share of Asian Americans might lead us to overstate any change in test scores (or other
positive outcomes) associated with the 2000 SY awards program. Fortunately, our estimates also
suggest that to the extent that such a bias exists, it will be small as long as higher scores do not
induce some schools who { in the absence of their higher score { would have received an award, to
in fact be denied an award. This so-called \monotonicity" condition appears to be reasonable in
our context.24
24For a discussion, see Lee (2005.)
244 Results
Having established that the data support the validity of our research design, we next discuss our
estimates of the impact of the award program on achievement and resources. As above to minimize
redundant plots, we only provide gures for 2000 SY awards program. In all tables, however, we
present estimates of the magnitude of the discontinuity, its standard error, and the F-test of the
correspondence between our polynomial t and the fully exible model for both award years.
4.1 Evidence on Achievement
We rst consider the impact of the awards program on the level of achievement. If schools that
win awards are able to spend these resources in ways that positively impact achievement, then we
should see a break in API scores at the discontinuity. In other words, schools that just barely won
the awards should have higher scores in subsequent years than their counterparts that just barely
missed winning an award.
Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c graphically represent our RD estimates of the impact of the 2000 SY
awards program on achievement levels in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c present
corresponding plots for the socially disadvantaged subgroup, the most common of all the subgroups.
Because the rst apportionment for the 2000 SY awards program was made in January 2001, the
middle of the 2001 academic year, and the second and nal payment in March 2002, the following
school year, we do not anticipate nding any impact on achievement in 2001 (as measured by test
scores in May 2001). 25 Thus, it is reassuring that, as shown in Figure 4a, 2001 school-wide API
scores are smooth across the awards eligibility threshold. The same basic pattern holds for the
2001 API scores for socially disadvantaged subgroups.
25See http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/sr/gp/history.asp for details on the history of awards apportionments. Note that
there were other awards programs for the 2000 SY but these were paid to teachers and not schools.
25To the extent that the additional resources were put towards instruction, as the CDE intended,
we might expect a bump up in achievement in the 2002 or 2003 school years. But, Figures 4b
and 5b also indicate that scores were smooth across the award threshold. Moreover, the close
correspondence between the polynomial ts to the API (the solid lines on either side of the awards
target) and the regression adjusted average API scores at each distance from the threshold (the
open circles) suggest that our estimates of the discontinuity in API scores (or lack thereof) is not
an artifact of our modeling choices. This is conrmed by the F-statistics reported in Table III.
The estimates from 2002 are considerably noisier. But, the graphical analysis and the estimates
provided in Table III broadly conrm a nding of no eect of the awards program on API scores.
Similarly, as shown in Panel B of Table III, we nd no evidence of an impact of the 2001 SY awards
program on schoolwide or subgroup achievement. In no case are the estimates of the impact of the
2001 SY award program on API scores signicantly dierent from zero.
We also examined alternative measures of academic achievement to test for an impact of the
awards program. Specically, we use measures of the percent of students in a school that tested
procient in English and language arts and in mathematics. These data, which are rst available
to us in 2001, are based on the California Standards Tests (CSTs) for grades 2-8 and the California
High School Exit Examination (CAHSEE) for secondary school students. While these scores have
been incorporated into the API over time { making them imperfect complements to the API {
they have the advantage of being reported in a very transparent form.26 Yet, for neither the 2000
nor 2001 SY awards program can we detect any evidence of improvements in either the percent of
students testing procient in ELA or math for schools that just qualied relative to schools that
just missed qualifying for an award. Analyses using API or prociency gain scores, noisier measures
26The CST in English and language arts was added to the API measure in 2002 SY. And, the CST in math and
the CAHSEE were added to the API in 2003 SY.
26of achievement, yield similar conclusions.
Finally, we also focus on the API scores of the subgroup that determined awards eligibility
within the school. The idea is that since this subgroup is the worst performing group in the school,
award resources in the following periods may be targeted to them. However, similar to previous
analyses, we nd no signicant impact of the awards on these subgroup-specic outcomes.
4.2 Evidence on School Resources
One reason for these null ndings, other than the simple possibility that resources do not translate
directly or easily into academic improvements, may be that GPAP funds were not used for instruc-
tion. There are several ways this could happen. First, it is possible that districts, which have scal
authority over schools, or the state, which provides much of the funds to districts, oset the awards
paid out by the GPAP through corresponding reductions in other funds.27 Under this scenario,
award schools might have no additional nancial resources to invest in achievement. Second, even
if neither districts nor the state undo the monetary transfer required by the GPAP, schools are not
constrained to spend these funds on instruction. In fact, they have almost complete discretion over
the use of GPAP funds, needing only the approval of the local school board. Thus, to the extent
that awards are spent on non-instructional sta, capital outlays, and so on, we may not expect to
see any improvements in academic achievement.
Unfortunately, scal data on revenues and expenditures are not available at the school level.
Rather, they are reported at the district level. This limits our ability to determine whether an
individual school receives its award money from the district and, if it does, how it gets spent. We
27Baicker and Jacobson (2006) provide evidence that counties engage in this type of budgetary osetting by reducing
allocations to police agencies that receive nancial rewards from state or federal government for drug enforcement
activities. Similarly, Gordon (2004) nds that increases in federal spending on low income school districts are oset
by reductions in local spending.
27can, however, observe school-level inputs such as the number of teachers per pupil overall, the
share allocated to each subject (math, English, science, physical education, and special education)
as well as the number of instructional computers per pupil and internet-connected classrooms per
100 students.
We have estimated the impact of both the 2000 and 2001 SY awards program on each of these
inputs for the 2001-2003 school years. Table IV presents a subset of these estimates. Panel A
presents our estimates of the impact of the 2000 SY award program on teachers per pupil, the
share devoted to math instruction, the share devoted to English instruction, computers per pupil
and internet connections per 100 students in the 2001 academic year. Panel B presents estimates
of the 2001 SY award program on the same category of outcomes but for the 2003 academic year.
We consider this year because the 2001 SY award disbursements were not made until July and
October 2002.
We nd little evidence of any changes in these inputs. Given that the award payments were
a one shot deal and hiring requires a long term scal commitment, it may not be surprising that
we nd little impact of either the 2000 or 2001 SY award program on the number of teachers per
student. On the other hand, we might expect to see a change in the allocation of teachers across
subjects, if, for example, increased funds could be used to encourage some instructors to switch
from their normal subject to one that is more valuable in an accountability system. But, our
estimates of the impact of the award programs on teachers per pupil and the share of teachers in
math or English are neither statistically nor economically signicant.
A more likely use of the award funds might have been for instructional resources. Indeed,the
California Department of Education anticipated that these funds should be used \for the purchase of
28computers, instructional materials, or playground improvements."28 But, like the CDE, we nd no
evidence that award payments were used to increase the number of computers or internet connected
classrooms within a school. If anything, the results for the 2001 SY award program suggest that
computers per pupil increased less among those schools that just qualied for awards than those
that just missed qualifying. But, this interpretation of the point estimate for computers per pupil (-
.020 with a standard error of .006) should be viewed with considerable skepticism. As our goodness
of t statistic and the corresponding p-value (.0002) suggest, the polynomial t for this model is
poor relative to the fully exible model. Thus, the estimated reduction in computers per pupil for
awardees relative to nonawardees is likely driven by functional form. The more important lesson
from Table IV is that we nd little evidence of increases in computers per pupil or any other
measure of resource allocations among schools that received the GPAP.
4.3 Evidence on Fiscal Outcomes
We next turn to the scal data. Although we cannot observe changes in an individual school's
revenue or expenditures, we can determine whether the state osets or alternatively disproportion-
ately increases funds to districts that just barely qualied for the GPAP relative to those that just
missed qualifying. And, if we nd no evidence of osetting, we should be able to trace out where
(district-wide) any additional funds get allocated.
In order to characterize where each district lies relative to the school-level award eligibility
threshold, we sort all of its schools by their distance from this threshold. We then assign to each
district the maximum of the school-level \award gap." Recall that because of the subgroup rules
we characterize each school's \award gap" as the minimum dierence between the gain scores and
28See page 4 of the statements from Patrick J. Chladek at the November 2002 National Conference on Teacher
Compensation and Evaluation, http://www.wcer.wisc.edu/CPRE/conference/nov02/chladek.pdf.
29targets for the school overall and each of its numerically signicant subgroups. Thus, each district
\award gap" is the across-school maximum of the within-school minimums. This denition of the
district \award gap" then picks up whether any school in the district received treatment. It further
characterizes the district according to the distance to the award eligibility threshold of the school
that performed best relative to this target. If any treated school in a district was far from the
award eligibility threshold, then the district as a whole will be characterized as far from the cuto.
If no schools were treated but at least one was close to its target, then the district as a whole will
be characterized as just barely missing award eligibility.
Figure 6 is the district level analogue to Figure 3a. It shows the mean district-level apportion-
ment per pupil in 2001 by proximity to the awards threshold (open circles) as well as the polynomial
ts to these data.29 The gure (and the results reported in the rst column of both panels in Ta-
ble V) provide conrmation that we can still uncover the treatment at the district level. Because
any given district may contain schools that won awards of varying per pupil amounts as well as
schools that did not win awards, the estimated discontinuity in apportionments is below that for
the school-level. For both 2000 and 2001, districts to the left of the eligibility threshold did not
receive awards apportionments and thus have per pupil award payments of (roughly) $0. At the
discontinuity the per pupil award payments jump to about $42 per pupil (with a t-statistic of about
12) for 2000 and about $28 per pupil (with a t-statistic of 9) pupil for 2001 test performance.
We next turn to district revenues and expenditure data. According to the School Fiscal Services
Division of the CDE, GPAP apportionments are classied as unrestricted revenues. The jump in
per pupil revenue at the awards threshold is, in fact, much larger than the $42 apportionment
29To save degrees of freedom, we estimate polynomials with equal slopes on either side of the polynomial. We do
not include covariates as these tend to decrease rather than increase the precision of the district-level estimates. Our
F-tests suggest that these ts are still quite close to the fully exible model.
30shown in Figure 6. The RD estimate (reported in Table V) suggests a jump of $104 per pupil (with
a t-statistic of 21) at the discontinuity. Why should this be so much larger than the apportionment
estimate? Other funds are also included in the unrestricted revenue category.30 But to the extent
that our RD provides quasi-random assignment, these funds should not dier systematically at the
awards eligibility threshold except through the (direct and indirect) eects of the award program.
Thus, the RD estimate in Table V implies that for every per pupil dollar a district was supposed to
get through the 2000 awards program, the district, in fact, received closer to $2.50 per pupil (with
a t-statistic of over 4). Some of these additional funds may be attributable to the $350 million
Schoolsite Employee Performance Bonus program. Bonuses, which were only available for 2000
performance, were allocated based on the number of FTEs in schools winning the GPAP and were
divided equally between a school and its employees. We were not able to locate any documentation
of disbursements under SEPB, however. Any additional funds not attributable to this program
may simply be evidence of crowd-in. In other words, the state may be further padding the budget
of districts with award winning schools. We nd no evidence, based on this revenue category, that
such activity continued in 2002 or 2003.
For the 2001 awards program, we do not detect any increase in unrestricted revenues until
2003. This makes good sense since apportionments for the 2001 awards program were not made
until the 2002-03 scal year. More importantly, as shown in Table V, the RD estimate suggests
that the unrestricted revenues only increase by about $20 per pupil (with a t-statistic of 3) at the
discontinuity. This implies that for every per pupil dollar a district was supposed to get through
the 2001 awards program, they, in fact, received only about $0.72 per pupil (with a t-statistic of
almost 3). We cannot reject that this point estimate is signicantly dierent from one. Thus, the
30Specic sources of revenue within this category are not available from district-level scal data.
31results for the 2001 program, when the only monetary awards at stake were from the GPAP, are
also inconsistent with crowd-out.
To see if the apparent increase in unrestricted per pupil revenues associated with the 2000
award program and the decrease associated with the 2001 award program were in fact real, we
next consider total revenues per pupil. This will help us get around any reporting problems as
well as allow us to estimate the net eect of the awards program on revenues. For the 2000 award
program (reported in Table V), we estimate a jump in total per pupil revenues in 2001 of about
$340. This estimate is only statistically distinguishable from zero at the 10 percent level. Taken
literally, it suggests that for every $1 per pupil increase in funds due to the 2000 awards program a
district actually received closer to $8 per pupil in revenues. This point estimate is only statistically
distinguishable from zero at about the 11 percent level. Moreover, some of the apparent crowd-in
may be driven by the additional awards programs that were in place in the 2000 school year. For
example, $100 million was paid to teachers in the form of bonuses as part of the 2000 Certicated
Sta Performance Incentive Awards Program. Because the eligibility target for this program was
twice that for the GPAP, only schools that qualied for the GPAP could have received it. It is
important to point out, however, that these awards were not classied as unrestricted revenue (but
rather had a category of its own). Thus, this cannot explain the more than dollar for dollar increase
in unrestricted per pupil revenues.
The estimate for the 2001 award program, while quite imprecise, implies an increase in total per
pupil revenue in 2003 of about $123 per pupil. In other words, contrary to what we might conclude
based on the unrestricted revenue alone, this estimate suggests that total per pupil revenues in
2003 may have also increased more than dollar for dollar as a result of the 2001 award program.
Total 2001 expenditures per pupil also appear to jump by about $343 dollars in response to the
322000 awards program. Similarly, 2003 expenditures per pupil increase by about $200 in response
to the 2001 awards. This estimate, however, is not statistically signicantly dierent from zero at
any reasonable level of signicance. Together, however, these estimates rule out the possibility of
signicant district-level crowd-out, and raise the possibility of signicant crowd-in, as a result of
California's Governors Performance Award Program.
Since anecdotal evidence suggests the awards ended up mainly as teacher bonuses, and to further
illustrate that the ow of resources due to this program was quite substantial, Figures 7, 8, and 9
plot the equivalent RD estimates in per teacher terms relative to the 2000 award threshold. Figure
7 shows the mean district-level award revenue per teacher in 2001 by proximity to the awards
threshold (open circles) as well as the polynomial ts to these data. Similar to Figure 6, this
provides conrmation that we can still uncover the treatment at the district level. Figures 8 and 9
also rule out district-level crowd-out and instead raise the possibility of crowd-in.
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this study, we focus on a relatively understudied feature of accountability systems - the pro-
ductivity of nancial rewards for schools making \adequate" progress on state achievement exams.
We analyze the case of California, where for the 2000 and 2001 school years, schools that met or
exceeded their accountability targets were eligible to receive monetary awards through the Gover-
nor's Performance Award Program (GPAP). In addition, for 2000, teachers and sta in winning
schools were also eligible for the Certicated Sta Performance Incentive Award (CSPIA) and the
Schoolsite Employee Performance Bonus (SEPB). Because these awards were allocated based on a
discontinuous function of school (and subgroup) test scores, we employ a regression-discontinuity
design to evaluate how they aected achievement and resources. This design allows us to take
33advantage of the possibility (veried in our data) that schools close to the eligibility threshold are
similar but for award receipt. In this framework, award receipt close to the eligibility threshold is
\as good as randomly assigned," much like in an actual randomized controlled trial.
We nd that the programs did have a signicant impact on the nancial resources allocated to
some schools and its sta. In 2000, the average value of the GPAP award was 60 dollars per student
and in 2001 about 50 dollars per pupil. More importantly, the nancial rewards from the GPAP
appear to have been supplemented by payments from other award programs (CSPIA and SEPB in
2000) and state budgetary discretion (in 2000 and 2001). At its peak in 2000, districts with schools
that qualied for GPAP awards received budgetary increases totaling about 5 percent of per pupil
spending. Since anecdotal evidence suggests the GPAP awards were mainly distributed as teacher
bonuses, teachers at winning schools could have earned up to $27,000, although we calculate $2,000
per teacher was probably more typical.
Despite the increase, we nd little measurable improvement in standard metrics of achievement,
such as exam performance, for those schools that received the award compared to those schools
that did not receive the award. This is perhaps not surprising, as Project STAR, which increased
resources by about 50%, yielded improvements in exam performance of less than a quarter of
a standard deviation (Schanzenbach 2006). Moreover, because the resources from California's
program are more akin to a random shock than a guaranteed income stream, schools may not have
been able to incorporate them into projects that determine educational achievement. However, we
also nd no increase in \capital expenditures," such as computers or internet connections, which
should be more responsive to a one-time shock.
It is also possible that the instability in the funding of the program weakened its incentives and
failed to act as a strong signal of reward for teacher and school administrator eort. Because the
34awards ended up being distributed mostly as bonuses to teachers (and possibly support sta as
well) in an eective school regardless of their individual contribution, the group-based incentives in
the GPAP can also have the free rider problem. The free rider problem could give rise to teachers
no longer exerting as much eort after award receipt, in the period when we evaluate the schools.31
Our estimates show that accountability \on the cheap" had no signicant impact across schools
that won awards versus those that didn't. On the other hand, we cannot assess if the program would
have a signicant impact if implemented in conjunction with other reforms, such as reduced class
sizes or raising teacher salaries.32 This also leaves the question of whether the competition for the
awards itself raised student achievement across all schools in California. However, a comparison of
1996-2000 4th and 8th grade Math NAEP scores shows California declined or performed the same
as the rest of the country during this period.33
Finally, our ndings also suggest that California's subgroup rules have had the (unintended)
consequence of making diverse schools as well as schools that serve disadvantaged populations,
more likely to fail their accountability targets. Because meeting these targets are tied to nancial
rewards, subgroup rules have had the unintended consequence of putting these schools at greater
risk of receiving relatively fewer resources.
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37A Academic Performance Index (API) Database
Established as part of California's Public Schools Accountability Act of 1999 (PSAA), the API
is calculated by the California Department of Education annually for all public schools. These
data can be downloaded from http://api.cde.ca.gov/datales.asp. Small schools, dened as having
between 11 and 99 valid test scores, as well as \very small schools" (fewer than 11 valid scores) are
evaluated under a separate \Alternative Accountability System." Growth targets are not calculated
by the Department of Education for these schools.
The API ranges from 200 to 1000 and reects a school's performance on various standardized
tests. Students in grades 2 to 11 are tested. The tests and indicators used and weights accorded to
each to calculate the API vary from year to year. Beginning with the 2004 API base, the weights
are applied at the individual student test level; prior to this, it was applied at the school level. The
State Board of Education (SBE) \recognizes that the question of the appropriate test weights is a
policy issue rather than a technical issue"; its members adopted test weights they believe \reect
the curriculum priorities in California public education." In practice, each school's content area
weights are determined based on the test weights established by the SBE and also on the number
of valid test scores in each content area and grade level at a school. Because of this, API calculations
result in content area weights that may be slightly dierent for each school.
In 1999 and 2000, the API was based primarily on the Stanford 9, a nationally-normed test
that is administered annually to California public school students in grades 2 through 11 as part of
the Standardized Testing and Reporting (STAR) program. In 2001, the API was based on (1) the
Stanford 9 and (2) the California Standards Test in English-Language Arts (CST ELA). In addition
to (1) and (2), the 2002 API was also based on (3) the California Standards Test in Mathematics
for grades 2-11, (4) the California Standards Test in History/Social Science for grades 10-11, and
(5) the California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE) for high schools. Beginning in 2003, instead
of the Stanford 9, norm referenced assessment was based on the California Achievement Test, 6th
Edition (CAT-6). Two new tests were also added: (6) the California Standards Tests in Science
for grades 9-11 and (7) the California Alternate Performance Assessment (CAPA) for students
with disabilities. With every addition/change in test components, the SBE changed the weights in
calculating the API and also added a scale calibration factor to minimize the impact of shifts in
tests and ensure that \the statewide average API does not uctuate solely as the result of adding
new API components."34
Although the components of the API have changed over time, the performance calculation has
not. In each year, a school's \API growth target" is ve percent of the distance from the previous
year's API to the statewide target of 800 or a minimum of one point growth between 1999-2000 or
5 points thereafter, as described more formally in the text.
Schools receive API scores as a whole as well as for each \numerically signicant ethnic and
34For additional details, see API information guides for each year at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ap/
38socio-economically disadvantaged subgroup in the school." These subgroups and what constitutes
numerical signicance are described more fully in the text. The subgroup target is calculated by
rst multiplying the school-wide target by 0.8 and then rounding the product to the nearest whole
number.
B Awards Apportionment Data
Under state PSAA requirements, if a school meets or exceeds its growth target, it may be eligible
to receive monetary or non-monetary awards through 3 programs: (1) the Governor's Performance
Award Program (GPAP) 35; (2) the Certicated Sta Performance Incentive Act; and (3) the
Schoolsite Employee Performance Bonus (authorized for 1999-2000 SY only). Currently, no funding
is appropriated in the budget for monetary awards.
Governor's Performance Awards (GPAPs) were paid for performance in the 1999-2000 and
2000-2001 school years. Awards were suspended thereafter because of budgetary problems. Ex-
isting site governance teams or the school-wide council decide how the funds from the GPAs are
used, which then gets ratied by the local school board. The data on the apportionments received
by each school for performance in the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 school years can be downloaded from
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/sr/gp/ap/apport00a.asp and http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/sr/gp/ap/apport99a.asp.
The GPA program was funded up to $150 per pupil, but there is substantial variation in the
rewards paid out in our data. There are 4 observations that suggest payouts over $150 per pupil.
Excluding those, the average reward was $66 per pupil (standard deviation $8.25) and ranged from
$21 per pupil to $111 per pupil for 7433 schools over the two school years.
The Certicated Sta Performance Awards (CSP) were paid only in 1999-2000 to schools that
made \substantial improvement in their API," which meant at least twice their API target. The
distribution of awards was decided by the local district in negotiation with the teachers' union. The
payment setup was such that teachers from schools with the highest growth received the largest
bonuses. In particular:
 1000 certicated sta in schools with largest growth got $25,000 each;
 3750 certicated sta get $10,000 each;
 7500 certicated sta get $5,000 each.
Since the eligibility was the same for the GPAP, the impact of the CSP as well as the Schoolsite
Employee Performance Bonus are all captured in our current estimates.
C School Characteristics
Data on school characteristics come from the California Department of Education's California Basic
Educational Data System (CBEDS), an annual school-based census. From CBEDS, we collect
35To qualify, elementary and middle schools (high schools) must have a 95% (90%) test participation rate, in
addition to the school and all its subgroups meeting or exceeding its API growth target.
39data on student enrollment, the allocation of teachers across subjects, and a host of demographic
characteristics such as racial breakdown, parental education, and percent of students receiving free
lunch. These data can be downloaded from http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/cb/lesethsch.asp.
D Fiscal Data
Fiscal data on revenues and expenditures are available not at the school level but at the school
district level. We also obtained this data from the California Department of Education. They
can be downloaded from http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/fd/fd/. From these unaudited scal data, we
create variables such as district level total spending per pupil, per pupil expenditures on all sta's
salaries and benets, teacher salaries, all classied sta salaries, all certicated sta salaries, books
and instructional materials expenditures, and other line items.
E Data for Analyses
We created two datasets for the analyses in our paper. The rst, which is at the school level, is
used to analyze the impact of the award program on school outcomes such as achievement and
school-level resources. It was created by merging the API, Award Apportionments, and CBEDS
databases together using the unique school identiers. Our analysis sample includes all schools
with valid scores and for whom we could determine eligibility to receive an award. These include
elementary and middle schools with at least a 95% test participation rate and high schools with at
least a 90% test participation rate.
Since we were also interested in examining the impact of the program on scal outcomes, we
also created a second district level dataset. To merge API and award eligibility information to the
district-level scal data, we rst collapsed our school-level dataset to the district level. For the
purposes of the regression discontinuity design employed in the paper, we characterize each district
by the maximum of the school-level \awards gap" or eligibility threshold. As described in the text,
due to the subgroup rules we characterize each school's \awards gap" as the minimum dierence
between the gain scores and targets for the school overall and each of its numerically signicant
subgroups. Thus, each district's \award gap" is the across-school maximum of the within-school
minimums. The district \award gap" as dened then picka up whether any school in the district
received treatment. Finally, we merged this collapsed data to the scal data using unique district
identiers.
40Table I
Awards Calculation for Two Elementary Schools in the 2001 School Year
a
Mission Elementary, ID No.: 7616486084941
Students Tested APIt APIt 1 Gain Score Award Target Award Gap
Overall 450 692 682 10 6 4
Black 71 610 589 21 5 16
Amer Indian 4
Asian 14 Not Numerically Signicant
Filipino 9
Hispanic 122 644 653 -9 5 -14
Pacic Islander 4
White 225 735 720 15 5 10
Disadvantaged 211 632 632 0 5 -5
Min Awards Gap -14
Salida Union Elementary, ID No.: 50712666113823
Students Tested APIt APIt 1 Gain Score Award Target Award Gap
Overall 453 696 664 32 7 25
Black 16
Amer Indian 1
Asian 2 Not Numerically Signicant
Filipino 7
Hispanic 218 627 576 51 6 45
Pacic Islander 5
White 201 763 745 18 6 12
Disadvantaged 212 625 593 32 6 26
Min Awards Gap 12
aNotes:
1. Only students in grades 2-11 are tested. Parents can obtain waivers for their children
exempting them from the exam.
2. A numerically signicant subgroup is any of the groups listed above with (i) at least
30 students with valid Stanford 9 scores and at least 15 percent of school's tested
enrollment or (ii) at least 100 students with valid Stanford 9 scores (regardless of
percent of tested enrollment).
3. The disadvantaged subgroup is not mutually exclusive, i.e. it may contain students
counted in other subgroups. A student is classied as socio-economically disadvan-
taged if (1) he or she qualies for free or reduced price meals or (2) neither parents
has received a high school diploma.
4. In 2000, the awards target = max (40 - .05  APIt 1, X) , where X = 5 for schools
and 4 for subgroups. This calculation is rounded up and is always based on school's
APIt 1 even for subgroups.
5. The minimum awards gap is the minimum of the awards gaps for a school overall
and each of its subgroups. The value must be non-negative for a school to receive an
award. School B received about $50 per pupil or a total of $42847 for performance
in the 2001 SY.Table II
Sample Characteristics by Award Receipt Statusa
Panel A Basic Statistics
All No Awards Award for 2000 Award for 2001 Award Both Years
Percent by Category 100 22.8 30.7 14.7 31.8
Award Per Pupil ($) 63.1 { 66.5 58.9 62.4
(7.76) { (2.67) (9.80) (8.21)
Total Award ($) 48554 { 53742 52566 45019
(29487) { (33739) (37973) (23890)
School Enrollment 856 1068 824 884 720
(606) (845) (541) (618) (366)
Elementary 69.7 49.3 70.5 65.7 85.3
Middle 17.1 21.5 17.4 21.7 11.5
High School 13.2 29.2 12.1 12.6 3.2
# of Subgroups 1.17 1.34 1.19 1.18 1.04
(0.74) (0.84) (0.71) (0.72) (0.67)
\Lost" Award 17.9 45.1 15.1 20.3 {
Panel B API Scores
All No Awards Award for 2000 Award for 2001 Award Both Years
School 652 632 669 636 658
(110) (108) (105) (112) (111)
African Americans 550 527 568 533 572
(88) (81) (88) (93) (83)
American Indians 579 530 653 667 583
(98) (76) (113) (63) (86)
Asians 749 708 782 737 761
(121) (124) (111) (116) (120)
Filipino 743 709 758 742 770
(70) (67) (65) (63) (65)
Hispanics 574 551 589 558 582
(86) (84) (84) (85) (85)
Pacic Islanders 585 475 696 { {
(120) (30) (19) { {
Whites 746 725 755 733 759
(75) (77) (71) (76) (71)
Socially disadvantaged 581 555 595 570 592
(86) (84) (84) (88) (84)
Panel C API Gain Scores, (APIt - APIt 1)
All No Awards Award for 2000 Award for 20001 Award Both Years
School 26 9.4 24 24 42
(30) (27) (32) (26) (23)
African Americans 27 9.4 28 30 51
(38) (29) (43) (35) (27)
American Indians 24 10 11 63 45
(39) (31) (29) (55) (34)
Asians 22 9.3 21 22 37
(28) (24) (28) (27) (25)
Filipino 20 7.1 22 18 37
(28) (23) (32) (25) (23)
Hispanics 31 13 28 30 49
(35) (32) (38) (32) (26)
Pacic Islanders 15 0 29 { {
(57) (29) (78) { {
Whites 22 10 21 20 37
(31) (30) (33) (29) (24)
Socially disadvantaged 30 11 27 30 49
(37) (34) (41) (32) (28)
aNotes:
1. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis.
2. Zeros are not counted in the award payment calculations.
3. American Indians are \numerically signicant" in only 29 school-years and Pacic
Islanders in only 8 school-years.Table III
Impact of the Awards Program on API Scoresa
Panel A: 2000 SY Awards Program
School Overall Socially Disadvantaged Subgroups
2001 API Score 2002 API Score 2003 API Score 2001 API Score 2002 API Score 2003 API Score
Mean 689 697 721 595 615 654
Treatment -3.56 -3.38 -5.58 .690 -.536 -1.98
(5.75) (6.24) (4.99) (7.00) (6.85) (5.37)
F-statistic 1.02 .949 .828 .979 .861 .778
p-value .416 .679 .960 .567 .916 .989
Panel B: 2001 Awards Program
School Overall Socially Disadvantaged Subgroups
2001 API Score 2002 API Score 2003 API Score 2001 API Score 2002 API Score 2003 API Score
Mean 699 723 616 656
Treatment .502 1.97 -2.24 1.95
(3.79) (3.92) (4.74) (4.78)
F-statistic .974 1.04 .937 1.00
p-value .591 .350 .725 .486
aNotes:
1. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the level of a school's distance
to the awards threshold.
2. The p-value corresponds to the F-test of the explanatory power of the 5th order
polynomial ts relative to the fully exible model.
3. Dierences in the mean API scores for a given year across award program samples
occur because some schools evaluated for an award in the 2000 SY are disqualied
in 2001 SY and vice versa. Disqualications are due to data irregularities, failure
to meet required participation rates, and so on. See text for further details.Table IV
Impact of the Award Program on School Resource Allocationsa
Panel A 2001 Allocations Relative to 2000 Award
FTE Per Pupil Share FTE Math Share FTE English Computers Per Pupil Internet Connections
Per 100 Pupils
Mean .048 .040 .065 .152 3.32
Treatment .0004 -.0003 .003 -.005 -.006
(.003) (.002) (.003) (.006) (.306)
F-statistic 1.12 .762 .884 1.63 1.07
p-value .121 .997 .875 .105 .252
Panel B 2003 Allocations Relative to 2001 Award
FTE Per Pupil Share FTE Math Share FTE English Computers Per Pupil Internet Connectionsl
Per 100 Pupils
Mean .049 .042 .064 .191 4.63
Treatment -.0006 .0002 -.003 -.020 -.490
(.0004) (.002) (.003) (.006) (.290)
F-statistic 2.22 1.10 .961 1.12 1.08
p-value .0000 .167 .642 .0002 .205
aNotes:
1. The rst row gives the mean of the dependent variables.
2. FTE are full time equivalent teachers.
3. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.Table V
Impact of the Award Program on District Resources
a
Panel A 2001 Per Pupil Allocations Relative to the 2000 Award Gap
Award Apportionment Unrestricted Revenue Total Revenue Total Expenditures
Treatment 41.8 104 343 348
(3.36) (20.6) (206) (186)
F-statistic .471 .721 .877 .716
p-value .999 .991 .829 .992
Panel B 2003 Per Pupil Allocations Relative to the 2001 Award Gap
Award Apportionment Unrestricted Revenue Total Revenue Total Expenditures
Treatment 28 20.2 123 202
(3.10) (6.92) (318) (302)
F-statistic .615 .786 1.12 1.08
p-value .999 .964 .174 .260
aNotes:
1. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.Appendix Table I
Predetermined Characteristics Relative to the 2000 SY Awards Threshold
a
Panel A 2000 SY Characteristics of California Schools
Enrollment Share Share Share Number of Disadvantaged
Free Meals Elementary High Schools Subgroups Subgroups
Mean 842 .471 .706 .124 1.08 .715
Treatment 26 -.047 -.033 .008 .039 -.031
(54) (.025) (.060) (.043) (.059) (.047)
p-value .631 .066 .578 .853 .510 .506
Panel B Share of Tested Students by Race/Ethnicity
Hispanic Black Asian American Filipino White
Indian
Mean .380 .081 .080 .010 .024 .418
Treatment -.015 -.018 .018 -.004 .008 .005
(.024) (.011) (.010) (.003) (.005) (.022)
p-value .543 .125 .068 .232 .116 .835
aNotes:
1. The rst row gives the mean of the dependent variable.
2. Standard errors are given in parenthesis and are clustered at the level of a school's
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Figure 1. API Growth Required to Qualify for Governor’s Performance
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Figure 2. Share of Schools Receiving an Award for 2000 SY  Performance
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Figure 3a. Per Pupil Award Payment for 2000 SY Performance
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Figure 3b. Per Teacher Award Payment for 2000 SY Performance
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Figure 4a. 2000 API Score
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Figure 4b. 2001 API Score
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Figure 4c. 2002 API Score
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Figure 5a. 2000 API Score for Disadvantaged Subgroups
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Figure 5b. 2001 API Score for Disadvantaged Subgroups



























−60 −50 −40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Distance to the 1999 Awards Eligibility Threshold
Figure 5c. 2002 API Score for Disadvantaged Subgroups
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Figure 6. District−Level Per Pupil Award in 2000 SY
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Figure 7. District Awards Category Revenue Per Teacher in 2001
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Figure 8. Total Per Teacher Revenue in 2001
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Figure 9. Total Per Teacher Expenditures in 2001
Relative to 2000 SY Eligibility Threshold